The Russian Subject of Victory

This is what I think is important.

No one knows the future for sure. No one knows for sure, however, even the present or the past. That’s why their interpretations vary so much. But the future is even more open. All the more unclear is the future in such a harsh and terrible war, which is going on now—with the collective West.

About the future we can only have hypotheses and plans. Both hypotheses and plans are closely related to each other. What the hypothesis, such the plan. And vice versa.

There are two main hypotheses:

1. Reconciliation is possible; and there are forces in the United States (in the West) that are ready to stop Zelensky.

2. Reconciliation is impossible until Russia achieves the complete surrender of Kiev and de facto control over the entire territory of Ukraine (that is, fulfills the goals of the Special Military Operation—demilitarization and denazification).

Hence the plans:

1. Based on the first hypothesis, we need to procrastinate and try to negotiate.

2. On the basis of the second hypothesis, we should prepare for an all-out war to the end, until total victory—as in the Great Patriotic War. Not necessarily to Berlin or the English Channel, but to Lvov for sure.

If we proceed from the first hypothesis, then we create preconditions for reconciliation. Of course, we are at war, but with a reference to the armistice.

If we proceed from the second hypothesis, then we forget about the possibility of an armistice in general. And we focus only and exclusively on the war. If we lack something for Victory, we correct the situation. If someone cannot or does not want to fight properly, we change personnel. If the mood of the elite and society prevents Victory, we change those moods—along with segments of the elite and even society. Because in war it is like what happens in war.

I am convinced that a truce is not possible at all. Or we will be offered such conditions that the whole political system of Russia will collapse if we accept them, because the people and especially those who have already entered deeply into the elements of war and have lost loved ones and relatives, who believed Putin and went to the front, will not be able to accommodate and accept it.

I would exclude the first hypothesis altogether. It is unlikely from the outside, and in any case will lead to the collapse of the system from the inside, even if someone from the outside—contrary to logic—will try to implement it.

It remains to act on the second hypothesis. But this is a completely different plan.

In 2014, the authorities managed to convince us of the existence of a “cunning plan.” There was no plan. There was faulty planning, based on false hypotheses. All we had to do then was bring in troops. And go as far as we could go. We hesitated; we believed in the armistice. We were deceived, and the President himself admitted it. And continued to be deceived. And there is no doubt that they will do it again. And someone on the inside was helping to deceive us. It would be interesting to know who exactly.

What we need now is not a “cunning plan,” but a sensible and well-tuned plan for victory. Everything that needs to be done to implement it, including any “unpopular measures,” should be engaged and as soon as possible (speed in modern wars decides almost everything). No one and nothing should be taken into account. Now, there is definitely no time for elections and no time for ratings.

Here’s what we have: a very unlikely armistice and a much more likely, almost guaranteed all-out war. Both of these hypotheses rule out the continuation of a peacetime policy. We have already passed this one. But we don’t seem to have really grasped it.

And accordingly, we need a subject of victory. Rational, decisive, strong-willed, sensible, immune to disinformation and dubious influences. A Russian subject.
By Alexander Dugin