Les sciences sociales connaissent des crises morales "scientifiques", politiques et intellectuelles en même temps que la crise morale "scientifique". Les tentatives d'ignorer ce fait sont l'une des raisons de la crise prolongée. Pour juger des problèmes et des méthodes des différentes écoles de sciences sociales, nous devons comprendre la grande variété des valeurs politiques et des défis intellectuels qui nous entourent, car nous ne pouvons poser aucun problème si nous ne savons pas à qui appartient ce problème. Ce qui semble être un problème pour l'un ne l'est pas pour l'autre ; cela dépend de l'intérêt personnel et de la mesure dans laquelle on en est conscient. De plus, il y a un problème insoluble : les gens ne sont pas toujours curieux de savoir ce qui constitue leurs intérêts.
People are not as rational as social scientists sometimes think. All this means that in their work researchers of human beings and society make moral and political choices either explicitly or implicitly. The work in the field of social sciences is always accompanied by assessments.
The history of these sciences knows a long line of doctrinal decisions, many of which are attempts to escape from acute questions, but there are also well-reasoned ones that touch upon the very essence of the matter of worldview. Often, the hierarchy of values is not taken into account at all, but is summed up in fragmented or ready-made answers, as is done in applied sociology when using hired technical performers. Covering himself with the value neutrality of his methods, the applied sociologist does not bypass the problem, but actually shifts it to others. Undoubtedly, a true master of intellectual labor will try to do his work with the full consciousness of the assumptions and hidden attitudes it contains, not the least of which are considerations about its moral and political significance for the society in which he works, and for the very role he plays in this society.
Nowadays, it has become almost universally accepted that one cannot derive evaluative judgments from actual statements and definitions of basic concepts. But this does not mean that such statements and definitions are completely devoid of evaluation. It is easy to see that most studies of social problems intertwine factual errors, vague definitions of concepts and assessments.
Only after a logical analysis can it be established whether there is any conflict of values in the formulation of a particular problem.
Whether such a conflict exists, and if it exists, the distinction between fact and value, is one of the primary tasks often undertaken by social scientists. Logical analysis can reveal the incompatibility of values in setting a single goal, which will quickly lead to the redesign of a problem that opens the way to solving it. For example, if new values cannot be achieved without sacrificing the old ones, then in order to act, the stakeholder must determine which values are of the greatest interest to them. But when the conflicting parties defend their values so firmly and consistently that the conflict cannot be solved either by logical evidence or by reference to facts, then there seems to be no reasonable solution.
We have to define the meaning and consequences of achieving certain values, we can agree with each other and specify their actual priority, we can back up our arguments with facts, but in the end we will have to reduce everything to judgments and counter-judgments, and then we will only have to beg or persuade our opponents. Ultimately, moral problems turn into problems of power, and the final recourse to power, if that is the case, is violence.
We cannot deduce," says the famous Yumov rule, "what we should do from what we believe in. Equally, we cannot draw conclusions about what others should do based on our own beliefs about what we would have done ourselves. But if that is really the case, all we have to do is hit the heads of those who disagree with us; hopefully, it is rare. However, being as judicious as possible, we must rely on common sense.