Из прочитанного

"Когда мы задаемся вопросом, имеется ли у кого-то опыт цвета, мы не спрашиваем о том, получает ли он стимулы из окружающей среды и обрабатывает ли он их определенным образом. Нас интересует, переживает ли он ощущение цвета, и это - другой вопрос. Таинственно то, почему такое состояние должно как-то переживать­ся; почему оно должно иметь некое феноме­нальное качество". Дэвид Чалмерс - "Сознающий ум. В поисках фундаментальной теории".

"Conscious experience is part of the natural world, and like other natural phenomena, it requires explanation. There are at least two main things to explain here. The first and most important is the very existence of consciousness. Why does conscious experience exist? If as seems plausible - it is generated by physical systems, then how does this happen? This leads to more specific questions. Is consciousness itself physical, or does it simply accompany physical systems? How widespread is consciousness? Does conscious experience exist, for example, in mice? The second thing that requires explanation is the specific nature of conscious experience. If we accept the existence of conscious experience, then why are specific experiences structured the way they are? When I open my eyes and look around my office, why do I experience a variety of experiences of precisely this kind? Or more fundamentally: why does red appear the way it does? It seems conceivable that looking at something red, say a rose, could produce the same experience as looking at something blue. Why is this experience? And why, by the way, does our sensation feel reddish, rather than something completely different, like the sound of a trumpet?" David J. Chalmers - "The Conscious Mind". In Search of a Fundamental Theory.

"From an objective perspective, we can speculate about the subtle interactions of fields, waves, and particles in the spatiotemporal manifold that lead to the emergence of complex systems like the brain. In principle, there is no profound philosophical mystery in the fact that such systems can process information in complex ways, respond to stimuli with sophisticated behavior, and even exhibit such complex capacities as learning, memory, and language. All this is impressive, but not metaphysically astonishing. But the existence of conscious experience seems, from this perspective, a new characteristic. We would not have predicted it from those parameters alone". David J. Chalmers - "The Conscious Mind". In Search of a Fundamental Theory.

"Our subject matter is perhaps best characterized as the "subjective quality of experience." Perception, thought, and action involve a whole host of causal and informational processes, but they don't typically occur in the dark. There's also an intrinsic aspect to it; something that expresses what it's like to be a cognitive agent, that is, conscious. Conscious experience ranges from vivid visual sensations of colors to the sense of subtle, familiar aromas; from sharp pains to fleeting thoughts we're about to recall; from everyday sounds and smells to stunning music; from a banal itch to deep existential dread; from the specificity of the taste of a mint candy to the universality of the experience of the self. All of these things have distinctive experiential qualities. They all play a prominent role in inner mental life. We can say that a being is conscious when there is something that expresses what it is like to be that being, to use a phrase made famous by Thomas Nagel. Similarly, we can talk about what it is like to be in such a mental state. That is, we can say that a mental state is conscious when it has a qualitative feeling associated with it, an associated experiential quality. These qualitative feelings are also known as phenomenal qualities, or, for short, qualia. The problem of explaining these phenomenal qualities is the problem of explaining consciousness. This is the truly difficult part of the mind-body problem". David J. Chalmers - "The Conscious Mind". In Search of a Fundamental Theory.

"For example, I have not disputed the thesis that the physical world is causally closed or that behavior can be explained in physical terms; however, if a physicist or cognitive scientist believes that consciousness can be explained in physical terms, then this is nothing more than a hope unfounded by modern theories, and the question remains open. In general, I have tried to make my ideas compatible with modern science, but at the same time have not limited myself to ideas popular among contemporary scientists." David J. Chalmers - "The Conscious Mind". In Search of a Fundamental Theory. P.S.: Causal closure of the physical world is a philosophical principle stating that every physical event has an exclusively physical cause. According to this concept, the physical world is a self-sufficient system in which no event can be caused by non-physical forces (e.g., the soul or an immaterial mind). Main aspects of the concept: Perfection principle: For every physical event, there exists a sufficient physical cause that explains its occurrence. Exclusion of the "spiritual": No non-physical factor can influence matter or change the course of a physical process. The problem of mental causality: If consciousness is immaterial, how can it control the body (for example, move an arm)? The closure principle denies this possibility. Free will: A paradox arises: if all processes in the brain are rigid physical chains, then free will may be merely an illusion. Physics and epistemology: Debates about whether scientists themselves violate this principle when they deliberately design experiments to understand the laws of nature.

В Тибете одиночество исполнено такого достоинства, какого я не встречал больше нигде. Теперь я понимаю, что значат слова «мой дом - Вселенная». Райнхольд Месснер - "Хрустальный горизонт"