Roman Golovanov: Alexander Gelevich, I saw a table on your Telegram channel that outlines Russia and the collective West, NATO. Here is a chessboard, that is, a division into parties of immediate defeat (liberals), delayed defeat (fifth column), victory (patriots) – this is about Russia. The collective West – the party of immediate victory – is MI6, neocons; the party of delayed victory – Biden and the Democratic Party; and the party of indifference – this is Trump and the Republicans. Can you explain how everything can move on this board? We have 10 minutes, let’s try to fit it in.
Alexander Dugin: I discussed this scheme with some of my close high-ranking friends. They told me: in principle, as always, you clearly describe what our responsible and serious decision-making center is dealing with. That’s how we see the situation. This fully corresponds to the picture with which really serious institutions in Russia are dealing with.
What’s important here? When we say ‘collective West’, we often overlook these three macrofigures of the black pieces, i.e., three decision-making centers.
Of course, today in the US, those who are indifferent to Russia – such as Trump, Trumpists, Tucker Carlson – are in the minority. We don’t need to consider them particularly now, but they exist, and as we move towards the elections, the influence of this party of indifference will increasingly grow. They will be making more and more claims to Biden purely on internal political grounds: why did he spend so much money on Ukraine? Why are there no bright results from the Ukrainians themselves? Why has he brought the world to the brink of nuclear war? And Biden will have to answer to this party of indifference. Besides, apart from Biden himself, who is, of course, personally responsible for this war, there are even more radical forces. I called them the ‘party of immediate victory’ of the West. They are the ones pushing for ruthless escalation: they are behind all the attacks that we are talking about and discussing today. They bet on the most brutal and wild terrorists, such as Kirill Budanov. They are convinced that the possibility of a nuclear strike by Russia is a bluff. They don’t believe in Putin, in his ideological component. They do not believe in his commitment to Russian civilization. They are extremely cynical and believe that Russia can now be finished. From their point of view, and in general from the point of view of the West, Russia lost. They believe that we lost since the ‘second army in the world’ cannot cope with the ‘twenty-second army in the world’. In any case, they believe that we have lost and we need to be finished off. At the same time, the decisions of the two parties – the ‘immediate victory of the West’ and the ‘delayed victory of the West’ often diverge: the ‘party of immediate victory’ blows up gas pipelines, and the ‘party of delayed victory’ says that the Ukrainians did it. The ‘party of immediate victory’ through its conductors, such as Kirill Budanov and other most radical figures in Ukraine, commits terrorist acts, and the ‘party of delayed victory’ says, ‘The Ukrainians did it without our knowledge.’ The entire picture of the positions of Western analysts fits completely into these three figures.
When we move on to our own, to the white, the picture becomes alarming. It turns out that of the three white pieces, only one is truly white – it’s the party of victory. And the rest, seemingly on our side, either agree to immediate surrender, like many oligarchs, Westernised liberals who have openly spoken out against this war (such figures can no longer be considered ‘white pieces’, they are simply repainted or slightly tinted black), or – the most ominous – the ‘party of delayed defeat’. This position is characteristic in our society, primarily in the elite, for those who understand that under any circumstances this war cannot be ended, especially since the same black figure of the ‘party of total immediate victory’ of the West will not give us any chances but is waiting for any opportunity to make peace as soon as such an opportunity presents itself. They are the ones holding back our will to fight to victory, to fight in earnest, as is proper in war, responding to all blows with symmetrical actions and attacks. This Russian ‘party of delayed defeat’, the sixth column, is the most dangerous.
It seems to me that the conflict that is brewing in our society between patriots, front-line people, volunteers, Wagner and the decision-making center in Russia is related precisely to the contradiction between our ‘party of victory’ and the ‘party of delayed defeat’. After all, the ‘party of victory’ insists that we use all forces, all resources for victory, understanding that no compromise is possible. And among our elite, and we constantly see these people, there are those who do everything possible to restrain and slow down our progress.
Prigozhin constantly speaks about them. On the Tsargrad website, ratings of Russophobes are published from time to time. We are beginning to clearly identify this ‘party of delayed defeat’, to know its representatives by name. Yes, today they are not able to oppose the Special Military Operation as a whole or to challenge Putin directly. But they still hope, despite everything, to negotiate with the West.
All six figures can line up in complex structures, enter into alliances and interactions, fight each other.
I do not take the Ukrainians themselves, among the decision-making centers there are none at all. Ukraine in this situation is just territories – this is a chessboard. But, there are three decision-making centres on that side and three decision-making centres on our side, with all the paradoxes and contradictions.
Both Russia and the USA are now entering a new electoral cycle, and the behaviour of these six figures, their ratios, their alliances, their agreements with each other, their mutual conflicts, information exchanges, disinformation, their promises to each other, the deals they make and many other factors – all this predetermines the complexity of the geopolitical picture that we see in Ukraine.
Some may find a scheme of six figures overly simplistic. But imagine that out of three figures on one side and three on the other, where each has different goals, uses different methods, is guided by different evaluations of the overall picture, each is a will center, a sort of subject. And depending on the ratio of all factors, proportions, power, strength, determination, intelligence, a complex system is built, which translates into the course of our war.
After all, everyone wants to understand what is happening, who is making decisions, in what contexts.
If you equip this general scheme with details, it can easily turn into a serious report with a lot of additional analytical materials, details, lists of presumed personalities, etc. It is important to grasp everything together, and geopolitics helps to grasp the overall picture. And you can detail everything to any degree. This is a matter of technique.
Interview with Alexander Dugin on the Golovanov Time show
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