Strategic scout
The CIA was the customer of the A-12, so the drumming capabilities for this machine seemed superfluous. However, Kelly Johnson wanted to realize the full potential of his brainchild: he believed that the Air Force also needed a high-speed high-altitude scout with the ability to strike ground targets. Discussions between Johnson and senior Air Force officials about the possibility of creating such an aircraft have been going on since 1958, but the official offer to Lockheed received only in March 1962. By this time, Skunk Works had been working on the project of strategic reconnaissance bomber R-12 for more than a year. The models of the two alternatives (R-12 and RS-12) were ready as early as April, and on June 4, the models were inspected by senior Air Force officers led by Commander General Curtis Lee Ma. Li May opposed Johnson's plans, considering the RS-12 project as a backup to the XV-70 “Valkyrie” bomber. The end of the argument was put by McNamara, who “buried” both programs. Strange as it may seem, “funeral” RS-12 turned out to be virtual, cunning Johnson changed the decoding of “RS” from “Reconnaissance/Strike” (reconnaissance/strike) to “Reconnaissance Strategic” (strategic intelligence) and continued to develop “universal A-12”, as he himself called RS-12.
It was the RS-12 that U.S. President Johnson talked about in his July 1964 speech — the plane appeared in the text under the designation RS-71, but the president confused the letters: the “SR” flew off his tongue and was firmly imprinted on the scout. In general, the change of letters in places in this abbreviation does not change the meaning absolutely — reconnaissance strategic or strategic reconnaissance. Index “71” denoted the next version of RS-70 (and the remaining virtual) bomber “Valkyrie”.
The contract for the production of six prototypes of the “universal A-12” company Lockheed concluded in late December 1962, these aircraft were intended by the CIA, not the Air Force — the military still could not decide whether they need such a plane or not. However, one of the engineers who took part in the program, believes that the Air Force simply wanted to shrug off a part of the financial burden on the CIA — not without reason the officers insisted on assigning the project the code R-12, emphasizing in such a way that it is “just” modification of the A-12. And yet, the opposition of SR in the Air Force was much stronger than in the CIA.
In the early 60s, there were heated debates in the United States about the further development of strategic technical intelligence. Air Force did not agree with the existing position, when strategic planes-intelligence were under the jurisdiction of the CIA, in turn, in the Office found a “new toy” — spies — spies with high-resolution cameras. At some point, the parties came to a consensus — all the reconnaissance planes are transferred to the Air Force, while the CIA gets satellites. It is possible to say that at the moment of reaching this very consensus the A-12 program ordered to live a long time: the military was more satisfied with SR.
Though the CIA managed to keep the already constructed A-12s in its wake, the increase in the numerical fleet of these vehicles was excluded. There were not enough funds even for the maintenance of scouts in a condition suitable for flights. Finally, the R-12 program of the Air Force was taken into their hands in the spring of 1963.
The first meeting of the model commission was held on June 13, 1963. The military were generally satisfied, but they constantly returned to Kelly Johnson's early ideas about the possibility of giving the scout a shock function. In August 1963, the Air Force added another 25 aircraft to the previous contract, up to a total of 31.
The SR-71 was prototype as the fourth prototype for the strategic reconnaissance aircraft, known as the YF-12C, which was an intermediate modification between the interceptor and the reconnaissance aircraft. Compared to the YF-12, the fuselage was lengthened by 0.91 m and returned to its original lateral shape. An enlarged fuel tank was installed at the rear of the fuselage. The main difference between the R-12 and the A-12 was the presence of a second crew member, whose cockpit was equipped in the section allocated to the A-12 under the photographic equipment compartment. The final assembly and equipping of the aircraft was carried out not at the Burbank plant, but in Palmate. Two trucks carried huge crates of fuselage and wings to Palmate in trailers on October 29, 1964. Apparently, it was after the arrival of the plane in Palmate that Lockheed's specialists began to work more closely with the military, and the SR-71 designation began to be used in
as an official
