Kutuzov, through his spy, received the news on November 1, which put the army he commanded in an almost hopeless situation. The spies reported that the French were in great power, crossing the Vienna bridge, headed for the way of Kutuzov's communication with the troops coming from Russia. If Kutuzov had dared to stay in the Kremlin, Napoleon's one and a half thousandth army would have cut him off from all reports, surrounded his forty thousandth exhausted army, and he would have been in the position of a Mack near Ulm. If Kutuzov had dared to leave the road leading to communications with Russian troops, he would have stepped off the road to the unknown edges of the Bohemian Mountains, defending himself against the superior forces of the enemy, and left no hope of communicating with Buxhoevden. If Kutuzov had dared to retreat on the road from the Kremlin to Olmiuz to join the troops from Russia, he risked being warned on this road by the French who had crossed the bridge in Vienna, and thus being forced to take the battle on a campaign, with all the burdens and burdens, and dealing with the enemy, three times his superior and surrounding him from both sides.
Kutuzov chose this last option.
The French, as the spies reported, crossing the bridge in Vienna, were marching on Znaim, lying on the way of Kutuzov's retreat, ahead of him more than a hundred miles. To reach Znaim before the French meant to get a great hope of saving the army; to let the French warn themselves in Znaim meant probably to expose the whole army to shame, similar to the Ulm, or general death. But it was impossible to warn the French with the entire army. The Frenchmen's road from Vienna to Znaim was shorter and better than the Russians' road from the Kremlin to Znaim.
On the night of receiving the news Kutuzov sent a four-thousandth vanguard of Bagration to the right mountains from the Kremlin-Tsnaim road to the Vienna-Tsnaim road. Bagration had to pass this crossing without rest, stop facing Vienna and back to Znaim, and if he could have warned the French, he had to detain them as long as he could. Kutuzov himself moved towards Znaim with all his burdens.
Having walked with hungry, well-mannered soldiers, without a road, through the mountains, on a turbulent night of forty-five versts, losing a third of the backward, Bagration went to Gollabrun on the Vienna-Cznaim road a few hours before the French came to Gollabrun from Vienna. Kutuzov had to go all day with his carts to reach Znaim, and therefore, to save the army, Bagration had to go with four thousand hungry, exhausted soldiers to hold on to the entire enemy army that met him in Gollabrun, which was obviously impossible. But a strange fate made the impossible possible. The success of that deception, which without a fight gave the Viennese bridge into the hands of the French, prompted Murat to try to deceive Kutuzov as well. Having met Bagration's weak detachment on the Tznaymskaya road, Murat thought that it was Kutuzov's entire army. In order to crush this army, he was waiting for the troops backed up on the way from Vienna, and for this purpose he proposed a truce for three days, on the condition that both of them would not change their positions and would not move from their seats. Murat assured that peace negotiations were already under way and that therefore, avoiding useless bloodshed, he proposed a truce. The Austrian Count Nostitz, who stood at the outposts, believed the words of Murat, the parliamentarian, and retreated by opening Bagration's detachment. Another parliamentarian went to the Russian chain to announce the same news about the peace talks and offer a truce to the Russian troops for three days. Bagration replied that he could not accept or not accept the truce, and sent his adjutant to Kutuzov with a report on his proposal.
For Kutuzov, a truce was the only way to buy time, to give the tormented Bagration's detachment a rest and to skip the wagons and the weight (the movement of which was hidden from the French), although one extra crossing to Znaim. The offer of a truce offered the only and unexpected opportunity to save the army. Having received this news, Kutuzov immediately sent the Adjutant-General of Wincenherode, who was in his care, to the enemy camp. Wincenherode had not only to accept the truce, but also to offer the conditions for the surrender, and meanwhile Kutuzov sent his aides back to rush the movement of carts of the entire army along the Kremsko-tsnaimskoy road. The exhausted, hungry detachment of Bagration alone had to cover this movement of wagons and the entire army, to remain motionless in front of the enemy, eight times stronger.
Kutuzov's expectations came true as to the fact that the surrender proposals, which were non-binding, could give time to pass some part of the carts, as well as to the fact that Murat's mistake should have been discovered very soon. As soon as Bonaparte, who was in Schoenbrunn, twenty-five versts from Gollabrun, received a report from Murat and a draft truce and surrender, he saw the deception and wrote the following letter to Murat.
"Au prince Murat. Schoenbrunn, 25 brumaire en 1805 à huit heures du matin.
Il m'est impossible de trouver des termes pour vous exprimer mon mécontentement. Vous ne commandez que mon avantgarde et vous n'avez pas le droit de faire d'armistice sans mon ordre. Vous me faites perdre le fruit d'une campagne. Rompez l'armistice sur-le-champ et marchez à l'ennemi. Vous lui ferez déclarer que le général qui a signé cette capitulation n'avait pas le droit de le faire, qu'il n'y a que l'Empereur de Russie qui ait ce droit.
Toutes les fois cependant que l'Empereur de Russie ratifierait ladite convention, je la ratifierai; mais ce n'est qu'une ruse. Marchez, détruisez l'armée russe... vous êtes en position de prendre son bagage et son artillerie.
L'aide-de-camp de l'Empereur de Russie est un... Les officiers ne sont rien quand ils n'ont pas de pouvoirs: celui-ci n'en avait point... Les Autrichiens se sont laissé jouer pour le passage du pont de Vienne, vous vous laissez jouer par un aide-de-camp de l'Empereur.
Napoléon" 1.
Adjutant Bonaparte was riding all the way with this formidable letter to Murat. Bonaparte himself, not trusting his generals, moved with all his guard to the battlefield, afraid to miss the ready-made sacrifice, and the four-thousandth squad of Bagration, having fun laying out fires, dried up, heated up, cooked porridge for the first time after three days, and none of the people of the squad did not know and did not think about what was coming to him.
1
Prince Murat. Schoenbrunn, 25 brumery 1805. 8 a.m. I cannot find the words to express my displeasure to you. You only command my avant-garde and have no right to make a truce without my order. You're making me lose the fruits of a whole campaign. Break the truce immediately and go against the enemy. You will tell him that the general who signed this surrender had no right to do so, and no one has the right, except for the Russian emperor.
However, if the Russian emperor agrees to the mentioned condition, I will agree too; but it is nothing but a trick. Go and destroy the Russian army... You can take its wagons and its artillery.
Adjutant General of the Russian Emperor is a cheater... Officers do not mean anything when they do not have authority; he also does not have it... The Austrians let themselves be deceived at the crossing of the Vienna bridge, and you let yourself be deceived by the adjutants of the emperor.