In the absence of a land front in Europe, the German leadership decided to defeat the Soviet Union during a brief campaign in the summer and autumn of 1941. To achieve this goal, the most combat-ready part of the German armed forces was deployed on the border with the USSR
Wehrmacht
Operation Barbarossa involved the deployment of three of the four army group headquarters (North, Center and South) (75 per cent), eight (61.5 per cent) of the 13 field army headquarters, 34 (73.9 per cent) of the 46 army headquarters and 11 (91.7 per cent) of the 12 motorized headquarters. A total of 73.5% of the total number of divisions available in the Wehrmacht were allocated for the Eastern campaign. Most of the troops had military experience gained in previous military campaigns. For example, out of 155 divisions, 127 (81.9%) took part in military actions in Europe in 1939-1941, and the remaining 28 were partially staffed with personnel who also had combat experience. In any case, these were the most combat-ready parts of the Wehrmacht. The German Air Force deployed 60.8% of its flight units, 16.9% of its air defense forces and over 48% of its communications and other units to support Operation Barbarossa.
Together with Germany, its allies were preparing for the war with the USSR: Finland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Italy, which allocated the following forces for warfare . In addition, Croatia has allocated 56 aircraft and up to 1,600 people. By June 22, 1941, there were no Slovak or Italian troops at the border, which arrived later. Consequently, the troops of Germany's allies deployed there included 767,100 men, 37 settlement divisions, 5,5502 guns and mortars, 306 tanks and 886 planes.
In total, the forces of Germany and its allies on the Eastern Front numbered 4,329.5 thousand people, 166 settlement divisions, 42,601 guns and mortars, 4364 tanks, assault and self-propelled guns and 4,795 aircraft (of which 51 were at the disposal of the Air Force General Command and together with 8.5 thousand people of the Air Force personnel in further calculations are not included).
The armed forces of the Soviet Union continued to grow during the war in Europe and by the summer of 1941 were the largest army in the world . In the five western border districts, 56.1% of the land forces and 59.6% of the Air Force were deployed. In addition, since May 1941, 70 divisions of the second strategic echelon from the internal military districts and the Far East had been concentrated in the Western Theatre of Military Operations (WTC). By June 22, 16 divisions (10 infantry, 4 tank, and 2 motorized divisions) had arrived in the western districts, with 201,691 men, 2,746 guns and 1,763 tanks.
The grouping of Soviet troops in the Western Theater was quite powerful. The overall ratio of forces by the morning of June 22, 1941, is presented , according to which the enemy surpassed the Red Army only in terms of the personnel because its troops were mobilized.
While the above data provide an overview of the strength of the opposing groups, it should be borne in mind that the Wehrmacht has completed its strategic focus and deployment on the theater, while the Red Army was in the midst of this process. As A.V. Shubin figuratively described this situation, "from West to East, a dense body moved at high speed. From the East, a more massive, but looser block, the mass of which was growing, but not fast enough, was moving out of the East "2. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the ratio of forces at two more levels. First, it is the ratio of forces of the parties in different strategic directions on the scale of the district (front) - a group of armies, and secondly, on separate operational directions in the borderland on the scale of the army - the army. In the first case, only the Army and Air Force are taken into account, and for the Soviet side there are also border troops, artillery, and Navy aviation, but without information on the personnel of the NKVD fleet and internal troops. In the second case, only the land forces are counted for both sides.
In the North-West direction, the troops of the German group of armies "North" and the Baltic Special Military District (Pribovo-Ovo) opposed each other. The Wehrmacht had a significant superiority in manpower and some in artillery but was inferior in tanks and aviation. However, it should be taken into account that only 8 Soviet divisions were located directly in the 50 km border strip, and another 10 were located 50-100 km away from the border. As a result, the group of armies "North" managed to achieve a more favorable balance of forces in the direction of the main strike .
Western direction
In the West, troops of the German Army Group Centre and the Western Special Military District (Zapovoroje) opposed each other with a part of the 11th Army of the Pribovo-Ovo. For the German command, this direction was the main one in Operation Barbarossa, and therefore the Army Group "Center" was the strongest on the entire front. Here were concentrated 40% of all German divisions, deployed from Barents to the Black Sea (including 50% of motorized and 52.9% of the tank) and the largest air fleet Luftwaffe (43.8% of aircraft). In the offensive lane of the Army Group "Center" in the immediate vicinity of the border was only 15 Soviet divisions, and 14 were located in 50-100 km from it. In addition, the troops of the 22nd Army from the Ural Military District, from which 3 infantry divisions had arrived in place by June 22, 1941, and the 21st Infantry Corps from the Moscow Military District, with a total of 72,016 men, 1,241 guns and mortars and 692 tanks, were concentrated on the territory of the district near Polotsk. As a result, the Zapovodovo troops contained in the peacetime states were inferior to the enemy only in personnel but surpassed him in tanks, planes and insignificantly in artillery. However, unlike the troops of the Army Group "Center", they did not complete the concentration, which allowed them to smash in parts.
The Centre Army Group was to double its coverage of the Bialystok guard force with a strike from Suwalok and Brest to Minsk, so the main forces of the Army Group were deployed on the flanks. From the south (from Brest) the main strike was made. The 3rd Wehrmacht tank group was deployed on the northern flank (Suwalki), which was opposed by units of the 11th Army of the Pribovo-Ovoo Region. Troops of the 43rd Army Corps of the 4th German Army and the 2nd Tank Group were deployed in the Soviet 4th Army band. In these areas, the enemy was able to achieve significant superiority .
In the south-west direction, the group of armies "South", uniting the German, Romanian, Hungarian and Croatian troops, was opposed by parts of the Kyiv Special and Odesa Military Districts (KOVO and Odesa Military District). The Soviet group in the south-western direction was the strongest on the entire front, as it was the group that was supposed to inflict the main blow on the enemy. However, even here the Soviet troops did not complete the concentration and deployment. Thus, in the KOVO in the immediate vicinity of the border was only 16 divisions, and 14 were located in 50-100 km from it. In the Odessa Military District in the 50 km border zone, there were 9 divisions, and 6 were located in the 50-100 km zone. In addition, the troops of the 16th and 19th armies arrived on the territory of the districts, of which by June 22, 10 divisions (7 infantry, 2 tanks and 1 motorized) with a total number of 129,675 men, 1505 guns and mortars, and 1071 tank were concentrated. Even without being staffed in the wartime states, the Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy group, which had only some superiority in manpower, but was significantly inferior in tanks, planes and a little less in artillery. But in the direction of the main strike of the Army Group South, where the Soviet 5th Army was opposed by units of the 6th German Army and the 1st Tank Group, the enemy managed to achieve a better balance of forces .
The most favorable for the Red Army was the ratio at the front of the Leningrad Military District (Leningrad Military District), where it was opposed by Finnish troops and the German army "Norway". In the Far North, the troops of the Soviet 14th Army were opposed by the German units of the Norwegian Alpine Corps and the 36th Army Corps, and here the enemy had an advantage in manpower and a small advantage in artillery . However, it should be taken into account that since the hostilities on the Soviet-Finnish border began in late June - early July 1941, both sides increased their forces, and the data do not reflect the number of troops of the parties to the beginning of hostilities.
Thus, the German command, having deployed the main part of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, could not achieve overwhelming superiority not only in the band of the entire future front but also in the bands of individual groups of armies. However, the Red Army was not mobilized and did not complete the process of strategic concentration and deployment. As a result, parts of the first echelon of the cover-up troops were significantly inferior to the enemy, whose troops were deployed directly at the border. This arrangement of the Soviet troops allowed to smash them in parts. The German command managed to create superiority over the Red Army troops on the main strikes of the Army groups, which was close to the overwhelming one. The most favorable balance of forces was formed for the Wehrmacht in the band of the Army Group "Center" because it was in this direction that the main blow of the Eastern campaign was inflicted. In the other directions, even in the strips of cover armies, the Soviet superiority in tanks affected. The overall balance of power allowed the Soviet command to prevent the enemy from dominating even in the directions of its main strikes. But in reality, the opposite happened.
Since the Soviet military and political leadership misjudged the degree of threat of the German attack, the Red Army, having started in May 1941 the strategic concentration and deployment in the Western TVD, which was to be completed by July 15, 1941, was caught off guard on June 22, 1941 and had neither offensive nor defensive grouping. The Soviet troops were not mobilized, had no rear structures in place and were only completing the establishment of command and control bodies on the theater. On the front from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians from 77 divisions of the Red Army's cover troops in the first hours of the war, only 38 not fully mobilized divisions could fight back the enemy, of which only a few had time to take up equipped positions on the border.
The rest of the troops were either permanently stationed or in camps or on the march.
If we take into account that the enemy immediately threw the 103rd division into the attack, it is clear that the organized entry into battle and the creation of a solid front of Soviet troops was extremely difficult. By anticipating the Soviet troops in the strategic deployment, creating powerful operational groups of its fully combat-ready forces in selected areas of the main strike, the German command created favorable conditions for the capture of the strategic initiative and the successful conduct of the first offensive operations.
On June 22, 1941, at 4 a.m., Germany treacherously, without declaring war, attacked the Soviet Union and, starting to bomb our cities with peacefully sleeping children, immediately declared itself as a criminal force with no human face. The most bloody war in the history of the Russian state began.
Our fight with Europe was fatal. German troops on 22.06.1941 began an offensive on the USSR in three directions: east (Army Group "Center") to Moscow, south-east (Army Group "South") to Kyiv and north-east (Army Group "North") to Leningrad. In addition, the German Army "Norway" was advancing in the direction of Murmansk.
Together with the German armies, the armies of Italy, Romania, Hungary, Finland and volunteer formations from Croatia, Slovakia, Spain, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and other European countries were attacking the USSR.
June 22, 1941, crossed the border of the USSR and invaded our land 5.5 million soldiers and officers of Hitler's Germany and its satellites, but the number of troops of only one Germany exceeded the Armed Forces of the USSR in 1.6 times, namely: 8.5 million people in the Wehrmacht and just over 5 million people in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. Together with the Allied armies, Germany had at least 11 million trained, armed soldiers and officers as of 22.06.1941 and was able to make up for the losses of its army and reinforce its troops very quickly.
And if the number of only German troops was 1.6 times higher than the number of Soviet troops, then together with the troops of the European allies it was at least 2.2 times higher than the number of Soviet troops. Here is such a monstrously huge force resisted the Red Army.
The industry of united Europe with a population of about 400 million people worked for Germany, which almost 2 times exceeded the population of the USSR, which had 195 million people.
At the beginning of the war, the Red Army had 19,800 more guns and mortars than the German troops and allies that attacked the USSR, 86 more warships of the main classes, and the Red Army was superior to the enemy in terms of the number of machine guns. Small arms, guns of all calibers and mortars were not only as good as German weapons but in many cases even superior to German ones.
As for armored troops and aircraft, our army had them in numbers far exceeding the number of units of this equipment available to the enemy at the beginning of the war. But the main number of our tanks and planes in comparison with the German ones was the weapon of "old generation", obsolete. Most of the tanks were only with anti-bullet armor. Faulty planes and tanks to be decommissioned also made up a considerable percentage.
At the same time, it should be noted that the Red Army received before the beginning of the war 595 units of heavy tanks KB and 1,225 units of medium tanks T-34, as well as 3,719 new types of aircraft: fighters YAK-1, LaGG-3, MiG-3, bombers IL-4 (DB-ZF), Pe-8 (TB-7), Pe-2, attack aircraft Il-2. Mainly we designed and produced the above new, expensive and science-intensive equipment in the period from the beginning of 1939 to the middle of 1941, i.e. mostly during the operation of the Treaty of Non-Aggression - "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact" signed in 1939.
It was the presence of a large number of weapons that allowed us to withstand and win. For with the huge losses of weapons at the beginning of the war, we still had enough weapons to resist the retreat and the offensive near Moscow.
It must be said that in 1941 the German army did not have equipment similar to our heavy tanks KB, armored attack aircraft IL-2 and rocket artillery such as BM-13 ("Katyusha"), which could hit targets at a distance of more than eight kilometers.
Because of the poor performance of Soviet intelligence, our army did not know the direction of the main strikes planned by the enemy.
Therefore, the Germans had the opportunity to create multiple superiorities of military forces and breakthrough our defense.
The possibilities of Soviet intelligence are greatly exaggerated in order to belittle the military merits and technical achievements of the USSR. Our troops retreated under the onslaught of superior enemy forces. Units of the Red Army had to either retreat quickly to avoid encirclement or fight in an environment. And it was not so easy to withdraw the troops, because in many cases the mobility of German mechanized formations, which broke through our defense, exceeded the mobility of our troops.
Of course, not all groups of Soviet troops were capable of moving German units. The main part of the German infantry came on foot, as well as our troops, which allowed many units of the Red Army to retreat to new frontiers of defense.
The encircled cover troops held back the offensive of the German hordes until the last opportunity, and the units retreating in the battles, joining the troops of the 2nd echelon, significantly slowed the progress of the German armies.
In order to stop the German armies that broke through the border, there was a need for large reserves equipped with mobile connections, which could quickly approach the place of the breakthrough and throw the enemy back. We did not have such reserves, because the country did not have the economic capacity to maintain an 11 millionth army in peacetime.
It is not fair to blame the USSR government for such a development. Despite desperate resistance to industrialization from certain forces inside the country, our government and our people have done everything they could to build and arm the army. It was impossible to do more in the period of time given to the Soviet Union.
But everything went wrong with Hitler: the Russians left more than half of their troops far from the border, announced mobilization after the beginning of the war, as a result of which they had people to man new divisions, took military factories to the East, did not fall in spirit, and fought steadfastly for every inch of the land. The German General Staff was horrified by the loss of people and equipment in Germany.
The losses of our retreating army in 1941, of course, were greater than the German ones. The German Army created a new organizational structure, including tanks, motorized infantry, artillery, engineering and communications parts, which allowed not only to break through the enemy's defense, but also to develop it deep, breaking away from the bulk of its troops for tens of kilometers. The proportions of all the troops were carefully calculated and tested by the Germans in the battles in Europe. With this structure, tank formations became a strategic means of fighting.
It took us some time to make such troops out of the newly manufactured equipment.
In the summer of 1941, we had neither the experience of making and using such connections nor the number of trucks needed to transport infantry. Created before the war, our mechanized corps was much less perfect than the German ones.
The General Staff of Germany gave the name "Barbarossa" to the plan of attack on the USSR by the name of the German Emperor of terrible cruelty. On June 29, 1941, Hitler said: "In four weeks we will be in Moscow, and it will be plowed.
No German general in his forecasts did not speak about the capture of Moscow later than August. For everyone, August was the deadline for the seizure of Moscow, and October was the deadline for the Soviet Union's territory to the Urals on the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line.
The U.S. military believed that in the war with the Russians Germany would be busy from one to three months, and the British military - from three to six weeks. They made such predictions, as they knew well the power of the blow that Germany brought down on the USSR. The West was estimating how long we would last in the war with Germany.
The German government was so confident in a quick-win that it did not even consider it necessary to spend money on warm winter uniforms for the army.
Enemy troops were advancing from Barents to the Black Sea at the front of more than 2000 kilometers.
Germany was counting on a blitzkrieg, i.e. a lightning strike on our armed forces and their destruction as a result of this lightning strike. The location of 57% of the Soviet troops in the 2nd and 3rd echelons initially contributed to the disruption of the Germans' calculations on blitzkrieg. And in combination with the steadfastness of our troops in the 1st echelon of defense completely disrupted the German calculation for blitzkrieg.
And what blitzkrieg can we talk about, if the Germans in the summer of 1941 could not destroy even our aviation? From the first day of the war, Luftwaffe paid a huge price for the desire to destroy our planes at airfields and in the air.
The People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry of the USSR from 1940 to 1946 A.I. Shakhurin wrote: "During the period from June 22 to July 5, 1941, the German Air Force lost 807 planes of all types, and during the period from July 6 to July 19, 477 more planes. A third of the German air force, which they had before the attack on our country, was destroyed.
Thus, only for the first month of fighting in the period from 22.06. to 19.07.1941, Germany lost 1284 planes, and for less than five months of fighting - 5180 planes. Surprisingly, only a handful of people in the whole of Russia know about our glorious victories in the most unfortunate period of war for us today.
So who destroyed these 1284 Luftwaffe planes in the first month of the war and with what weapons? These planes destroyed our pilots and anti-aircraft gunners just as our artillerymen destroyed our tanks because the Red Army had anti-tank guns, planes, and anti-aircraft guns.
And in October 1941, the Red Army had enough weapons to hold the front. At this time, the defense of Moscow was conducted at the limit of human strength. So only Soviet, Russian people could fight. Stalin deserves a kind word, who in July 1941 organized the construction of concrete dotted houses, Kotov, anti-tank barriers and other protective military construction structures, fortified areas (Level) on the outskirts of Moscow, who managed to give weapons, ammunition, food and uniforms to the fighting army.
Germans were stopped near Moscow, first of all, because in autumn 1941 our men fighting with the enemy had weapons to shoot down planes, burning tanks and mix the enemy's infantry with the ground.
On November 29, 1941, our troops liberated Tikhvin in the south of Rostov-on-Don, and in the north on December 9, 1941, they liberated him. Having fettered the southern and northern groups of German troops, our command created favorable conditions for the offensive of the Red Army near Moscow.
It was not the Siberian divisions that made it possible for our troops to go on the offensive near Moscow, but the reserve armies created by the Stavka and pulled up to Moscow before our troops went on the offensive. A. M. Vasilevsky recalled: "A major event was the completion of preparation of regular and extraordinary reserve formations. At the turn of Vytegra - Rybinsk - Gorky - Saratov - Stalingrad - Astrakhan a new strategic boundary for the Red Army was being created. Here, on the basis of the decision of the State Defense Committee made on October 5, ten reserve armies were formed. Their creation throughout the Battle of Moscow was one of the main and daily concerns of the Central Committee of the Party, GKO and Stake. We, the heads of the General Staff, reported daily to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the situation on the fronts and reported in detail on the progress in the creation of these formations. It can be said without exaggeration that at the end of the Battle of Moscow it was crucial that the party and the Soviet people formed, armed, trained and transferred new armies to the capital in a timely manner.
The Battle of Moscow can be divided into two parts: the defensive from September 30 to December 5, 1941, and the offensive from December 5 to April 20, 1942.
And if in June 1941 we were suddenly attacked by German troops, in December 1941, near Moscow, our Soviet troops suddenly attacked the Germans. Despite the deep snow and frost our army successfully attacked. Panic began in the German army. Only Hitler's intervention prevented a complete defeat of the German troops.
The monstrous force of Europe, faced with the Russian force, could not defeat us and under the blows of the Soviet troops ran back to the West. In 1941 our great-grandfathers and grandfathers defended the right to life and, meeting the New Year of 1942, proclaimed toasts for the Victory.
In 1942, our troops continued to attack. Moscow and Tula regions, many districts of Kalinin, Smolensk, Ryazan, and Orel regions were liberated. Losses in the maneuverability of only the group of armies "Center", which had recently stood near Moscow for the period from January 1 to March 30, 1942, amounted to over 333 thousand people.
But the enemy was still strong. Already by May 1942, the German fascist army had 6.2 million people and superior to the Red Army weaponry. Our army numbered 5.1 million people without air defense and Navy troops.
Thus, in the summer of 1942, Germany and its allies had 1.1 million more soldiers and officers against our land forces. From the first day of the war until 1943, Germany and its allies maintained their superiority in the number of troops. In the summer of 1942, 217 divisions and 20 enemy brigades operated on the Soviet-German front, which is about 80% of all German Army troops.
In connection with this fact, the Stavka did not transfer troops from the West to the South-West direction. Such a decision was correct, as well as the decision to place strategic reserves near Tula, Voronezh, Stalingrad, and Saratov.
More of our forces and means were concentrated not on the southwest, but on the west. In the end, this distribution of forces led to the defeat of the German army, or rather the European army, and it is inappropriate to talk about the wrong distribution of our troops by the summer of 1942. It was thanks to this distribution of troops that in November we had the opportunity to assemble sufficient forces at Stalingrad to defeat the enemy and were able to replenish our troops in the course of defensive battles.
In the summer of 1942, we could not keep the defense against the superior German forces for a long time in the direction of the main strike and had to retreat under the threat of the surroundings.
It was not yet possible to compensate for the shortage of artillery, aircraft and other weapons, as the evacuated companies were only just starting to operate at full capacity, and the military industry in Europe was still superior to the military industry of the Soviet Union.
German troops continued their offensive along the western (right) bank of the Don and sought to reach the great bend of the river at all costs. The Soviet troops retreated to the natural frontiers, where they could gain a foothold.
By the middle of July, the enemy captured Valuiki, Rossosh, Boguchar, Cantemiruvka, Millerovo. The eastern road to Stalingrad and the southern road to the Caucasus opened before him.
The Battle of Stalingrad is divided into two periods: defensive from July 17 to November 18 and offensive, which ended with the elimination of a huge group of enemies, from November 19, 1942, to February 02, 1943.
The defensive operation began at the far outskirts of Stalingrad. From July 17, the advanced detachments of the 62nd and 64th armies were fiercely resisting the enemy for 6 days at the turn of the Chir and Tsimla rivers.
Stalingrad could not be taken by the German troops and their allies.
The offensive of our troops began on November 19, 1942. The troops of the South-Western and Don fronts went on the offensive. This day went down in our history as the Day of Artillery. On November 20, 1942, the troops of the Stalingrad Front launched an offensive. On November 23, the troops of the South-Western and Stalingrad fronts joined forces in the region of Kalach-on-Donu, Soviet, closing the ring of the German troops' entourage. Everything was calculated very well by our General Staff, tying the Paulus army in arms and legs a long distance from our advancing troops, the 62nd Army in Stalingrad, and the offensive of the Don Front.
New Year's Eve of 1943, our brave soldiers and officers greeted, as well as New Year's Eve 1942 winners.
A huge contribution to the organization of the victory near Stalingrad was made by the Stavka and the General Staff headed by A. M. Vasilevsky.
During the Battle of Stalingrad, which lasted 200 days and nights, Germany and its allies lost ¼ of the forces operating at that time on the Soviet-German front.
"Total losses of enemy troops in the area of Don, Volga, Stalingrad amounted to 1.5 million people, up to 3500 tanks and assault guns, 12 thousand guns and mortars, up to 3 thousand planes and a large number of other equipment. Such losses of forces and means had a catastrophic impact on the overall strategic situation and shocked the entire military machine of Hitler's Germany to the ground", - wrote Zhukov.
During the two winter months of 1942-1943, the defeated German army was thrown back to the positions from which the offensive began in the summer of 1942. This great victory of our troops gave additional strength to both fighters and home front workers.
German troops and their allies suffered a defeat near Leningrad. On January 18, 1943, the troops of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts joined forces, the ring of the blockade of Leningrad was broken through.
The narrow corridor in width of 8-11 kilometers adjoining to the southern coast of Ladoga lake, has been cleared of the enemy and has connected Leningrad with the country. Long-distance trains began to run from Leningrad to Vladivostok.
Hitler was going to take Leningrad for 4 weeks to July 21, 1941, and the liberated troops to send to storm Moscow, but could not take the city and by January 1944. Hitler ordered the proposals to surrender the city to the German troops not to accept and erase the city from the face of the earth, but in fact, the German divisions that stood under Leningrad were erased from the face of the earth by the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts. Hitler stated that Leningrad would be the first large city captured by the Germans in the Soviet Union and spared no effort to capture it, but did not take into account that it was not at war in Europe, but in Soviet Russia. He did not take into account the courage of Leningraders and the strength of our weapons.
The victorious end of the Battle of Stalingrad and the breakthrough of the blockade of Leningrad became possible not only due to the steadfastness and courage of the Red Army soldiers and commanders, the ingenuity of our soldiers and the knowledge of our commanders but above all due to the heroic work of the rear.
From June 1941 to February 01, 1942, 12.4 million people were evacuated to the rear of the country. Another 8 million people were evacuated during the second wave of evacuation in the summer of 1942.
These 20.4 million evacuated Soviet people provided accommodation, food, work, and medical care. World history did not know anything like that. Together with the local population, they restored 2.5 thousand evacuated enterprises at the new places.
By the way, the peoples of the USSR during the war gave the state money and jewelry for the production of weapons worth 16 billion rubles.
They surrendered voluntarily and free of charge.
The losses of German troops were so great that by the summer of 1943, despite the total mobilization, Germany could not bring the number of its troops on the Eastern Front to the level of spring and autumn 1942.
The USSR did not have such losses, and by the summer of 1943, there were 6.6 million people in our active army. For the first time in the war, the number of Soviet troops exceeded the number of enemy troops.
But the liberals persistently convince us that the war was won not by the multi-millionth Red Army, but by 1-2% of its member companies and battalions.
By the summer of 1943, the Soviet Union had almost twice as many tanks and assault guns, as well as guns and mortars, and more than three times as many combat planes.
The Red Army had 105 thousand guns and mortars, about 2200 rocket artillery guns, 10.2 thousand tanks, and ACSs, over 10.2 thousand combat planes.
The enemy had 54,3 thousand guns and mortars, 5 thousand 850 tanks and assault guns, 2980 combat planes.
At such quantity of the weapon the Red Army, certainly, has won the Kursk battle and has driven the opponent further, for Dnepr, on the West. After the Battle of Kursk, which took place from July 5 to August 23, 1943, German troops were unable to conduct large offensive operations.
The head of the Soviet Union, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin summed up the battle of Kursk with the following words: "If the battle of Stalingrad heralded the sunset of the German fascist army, the battle of Kursk put it before the catastrophe.